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Various government-owned businesses provide water supply services to Australian residents.  
With the advent of recent competition and regulatory reforms in infrastructure industries in 
Australia, more and more of these businesses are now facing new types of incentive-based 
regulatory regimes.  This has led to a desire for more information on the performance of these 
businesses, both relative to each other and over time.  In this study we use panel data on the 
18 largest Australian water services businesses, observed over an eight-year period from 
1995/6 to 2002/3, to measure the relative efficiency and productivity growth of these 
businesses.  Data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods are used to obtain estimates of the 
multi-input, multi-output production technology.  The potential use of these performance 
measures in price-cap regulation is discussed, where the effects of variable selection and data 
quality upon empirical results is emphasised.   
 
 
*  Comments provided by seminar audiences at Deakin University and the Australian National University are 
gratefully acknowledged.     2
 
1. Introduction 
The principal aim of this paper is to conduct an analysis of the performance of the urban 
water supply industry in Australia.  This will involve the use of empirical techniques that can 
accommodate the multi-input, multi-output nature of the industry, which will be used to 
provide estimates of the relative efficiency, and historical productivity growth of each of the 
main urban water supply businesses in Australia.  The main motivation for the study is to 
provide comprehensive performance information to help regulatory authorities set CPI-X 
price paths that encourage efficient performance.  However, the paper contains considerable 
discussion of the data shortcomings that exist and hence the degree to which these measures 
should be used in a “light-handed” manner in any regulatory deliberations.  Furthermore, we 
indicate that considerable work is required in improving the comparability of data, especially 
in the area of capital, before these types of measures can be used in a reliable manner. 
Water users in Australia can be divided into two groups: (i) agricultural and (ii) 
residential and industrial.  The businesses that supply water to the latter group of consumers 
can also be divided into two groups: (i) businesses that primarily supply water to small 
regional towns and rural communities, and (ii) larger businesses that generally supply water 
to the state capital cities and larger regional cities.   
The latter group of large businesses are the focus of the present study.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, these large businesses are generally owned by state governments or territories 
and their prices tend to be regulated by independent regulatory agencies, while the smaller 
businesses are usually owned by local town councils, without formal independent price 
regulation.
1  Second, the larger businesses formed an industry association known as the 
Water Supply Association of Australia (WSAA) in 1995, and have subsequently been 
collecting high quality data for benchmarking purposes, which they make public in an annual 
publication known as WSAAfacts (see WSAA 2003).  The members of WSAA are a 
significant part of the Australian water supply sector, supplying water to roughly two-thirds 
of the Australian population.
2   
                                                 
1 Australia has three levels of government: (i) a federal government; (ii) states and territories; and (iii) local 
councils.  There are six states (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania) and two territories (Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory).   
2 From this point forward, when we refer to the water supply industry we will be specifically referring to these 
WSAA businesses.   3
A description of the history and current regulatory structure of the Australian water 
supply industry is difficult to provide, because it differs from one state to another.  However 
the following description is applicable to the majority of businesses.  First, these businesses 
have generally been government owned (i.e. either by a state government or a local council) 
for much of the 20
th century, and still are.
3  Price levels have traditionally been set by the 
government.  These prices have often been set so as to not cover all costs of production (ie. 
have been subsidised) and have generally been in the form of a fixed charge based upon the 
rated value of the property being connected.  Thus, cross-subsidies have been common (King 
and Maddock, 1996, p20 and 26). 
During the last decade a number of reforms have been implemented in the water 
sector, which mirror similar changes introduced in a number of infrastructure sectors in 
Australia.  The businesses have been required to be more commercial in their operations and 
structure, while generally remaining in government ownership.  This process has become 
known as “corporatisation”.  The key changes relate to: (i) introduction of a corporate 
structure of management; (ii) earning revenues which are sufficient for the business to earn a 
commercial rate of return on its capital investment; and (iii) an independent regulator is used 
to set prices at arms length from the government owner.  For further detail see King and 
Maddock (1996, p21).   
Each state and territory has a regulatory authority that is responsible for regulating 
prices charged for water by the major urban water supply businesses, plus other 
responsibilities (e.g. in the electricity and gas sectors).  The different state regulators use 
similar but not identical methods in regulating water prices.  For example, the NSW 
regulator, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), uses CPI-X regulation, 
via what is known as the “building blocks approach”.  This is a form of regulation that is a 
messy blend of incentive regulation and rate of return regulation, which is used by most 
regulatory authorities in Australia. 
In CPI-X price regulation, the regulated business is permitted to increase its prices 
over a particular period (usually five years) by the change in the consumer price index (CPI) 
minus an X factor.  The X factor is generally called a productivity offset, because it reflects 
the degree to which the regulator believes the business can improve its productivity (i.e. 
                                                 
3 The one exception is in Adelaide where the assets remain government owned but the government has 
contracted a private company, United Water, to manage, maintain and operate the business over a 15-year 
contract period ending in 2010.   4
reduce its costs in real terms).  However, the X factor can also incorporate other things, such 
as an allowance for the extra costs associated with required improvements in quality.
4 
The setting of the X factor value is always the subject of considerable debate.  Most 
Australian regulators hire consultants to study the operations of each company and identify 
possible areas for cost savings.  However, this approach is not without its criticisms.  First, it 
is generally a fairly invasive process, because the consultants require a lot detailed 
information to make their assessments.  Second, there is a perception that the conclusions 
made by the consultants are rather “black box” in nature because they are generally difficult 
to verify in a scientific manner.  Third, information asymmetries tend to ensure that the 
business managers always know more about the true nature of the “efficient costs” of 
production, relative to the hired consultants.  Fourth, the use of a business’ own performance 
record to set an X factor may create incentives for the business to not attempt to improve its 
rate of productivity growth because of the danger that it will lead to a higher X factor in the 
next regulatory period. 
These types of issues have encouraged some regulators to consider the use of industry 
benchmarks in the setting of X factors.
5  This generally involves the calculation of industry-
level measures of average annual productivity growth using historical data, and/or the 
calculation of firm-level measures of relative efficiency, which are measured relative to an 
estimated production frontier, using a method such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) or 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).  These methods have the advantage that they are less 
invasive and provide greater incentives for efficiency improvements.  However, these 
methods have the disadvantage that it is often difficult to capture all aspects of a particular 
businesses’ operating environment in a single production model, and hence the results of 
these methods need to be used in concert with additional information. 
From our search of the published literature, we were unable to identify any studies 
that have applied these techniques to data on Australian water supply businesses.  The best 
source of relative performance information currently available is WSSA (2003), which 
provides a range of partial productivity measures, such as operating costs per connection and 
per unit volume of water delivered, for each of its members over a number of years.   
                                                 
4 For example, the UK water regulator, OFWAT, actually allowed prices to increase in real terms in its first 
price determination, because it required the UK businesses to make substantial investments in new capital to 
achieve newly mandated quality targets.  See, Saal and Parker (2000) for discussion. 
5 For example, see the electricity supply case described in Diewert and Lawrence (2004).   5
However, WSAA (2003) does not attempt to calculate more comprehensive productivity 
measures for the industry. 
Hence, as noted earlier, the main aim of this paper is to fill this gap by conducting a 
detailed analysis of the performance of the urban water supply industry in Australia, using 
empirical techniques that can accommodate the multi-input, multi-output nature of the 
industry, which can be used provide estimates of the relative efficiency and historical 
productivity growth of each of the main urban water supply businesses in Australia.   
The remainder of the paper is organised into sections.  In section 2 we provide a brief 
description of the Australian water supply industry and the factors that are likely to contribute 
to differences in production costs between businesses and over time.  In section 3 we review 
some recent international analyses of water supply efficiency. In section 4 we describe the 
data envelopment analysis methods that are used in this paper, before presenting our 
empirical results in section 5, and making some concluding comments in the final section. 
 
2. The Australian Water Supply Industry 
The production process that is used to supply water to urban areas in Australia is fairly 
straight forward.  One generally obtains raw water from a purpose built dam (or pumps it out 
of a river or groundwater aquifer), pipes it to a treatment plant for treatment, and then pipes it 
to households and businesses.  However, comparisons of the relative efficiency of urban 
water supply businesses in Australia is a difficult exercise, because these firms operate in a 
wide variety of environments.  Hence, cost comparisons are likely to be influenced by a 
number of factors that are not under the control of management.   
Some information on the characteristics of the 18 businesses we consider in our 
empirical analysis is listed Table 1.
6  As can be seen, these businesses differ in various 
aspects, including the size of the business, the volumes of water delivered per customer, and 
the mix of residential and non-residential customers (i.e. commercial and industrial).  Some 
of these and other factors that could influence the costs of production across these businesses 
are now discussed. 
 
                                                 
6 Note that the city of Melbourne is serviced by one wholesale water collection and treatment business 
(Melbourne Water Corporation) and three water distribution businesses (City West, South East and Yarra 
Valley).  Thus the data listed for Melbourne Consolidated corresponds to these four businesses combined, while 
the cost data listed for the three water distribution businesses includes the costs of purchasing water from the 
wholesaler.  Similarly, also note that Sydney, Brisbane and Gold Coast purchase bulk water from a wholesaler 
and that their costs include the costs of purchasing water from the wholesaler.   6
[Table 1 here] 
 
A high percentage of non-residential customers is likely to be associated with higher 
costs per connection because these customers tend to consume higher volumes, but it is also 
likely to reduce costs per mega litre because of reductions in connection related costs and the 
fact that some industrial customers require lower levels of water treatment.  From Table 1 we 
see that the percentage of non-residential customers is fairly uniform across the Australian 
businesses, with an average of 8.55%, however a few businesses do deviate to some extent, 
from a high of 12.24 in Goulburn Valley to a low of 4.62 in Gosford.  
A high percentage of water from non-catchment sources (such as rivers and 
groundwater) is likely to be associated with lower capital costs (i.e. less dams needed) but 
conversely is likely to be associated with higher operating costs, due to larger amounts of 
pumping and treatment required.  From Table 1 we see that these Australian water businesses 
derive less than 20% of their water from non-catchment sources (ie. pumping from rivers and 
groundwater), on average.  However, three businesses derive over half of their water from 
non-catchment sources, namely Hunter, Perth and Barwon.   
Higher  average rainfall is likely to reduce the capital costs of water catchment 
because smaller dams are required since they are replenished more quickly.  Average rainfall 
levels vary significantly across these businesses, from a low of 458mm in the Goulburn 
Valley in the south to a high of 1,953mm in Darwin in the tropical north. 
Temperature differences can have a range of effects.  Higher average temperatures 
can increase the demand for watering gardens and hence increase volumes per customer, 
while a wide range of temperatures over the year can result in a high peak to average flow 
ratio, the latter leading to larger capital costs per unit volume delivered, because the network 
needs to be built to accommodate the peak.  Information on average maximum temperatures 
and peak to average flows are presented in Table 1, where we see that average maximum 
temperatures do not vary significantly, with all but Darwin (with 33 degrees Celsius) lying in 
the range from 19 to 26 degrees.  The data on the ratio of peak to average flow is also fairly 
uniform, with most values lying in the range from 1.5 to 2.0.  This is not a wide amount of 
variation, given that the numerator in this ratio depends upon water demand on a single day 
in the year.   7
A higher network density is likely to reduce costs associated with water distribution 
because less pipe infrastructure is needed per connection.
7  Information on the number of 
connections per km of mains pipeline is presented in Table 1.  This shows a range of 
densities, from around 60 to 70 for most large cities to around 30 for those businesses that 
service the regional centres.  
A large business size may result in lower costs because of scale economies, but if the 
large size is associated with serving a large city, then this may also increase the capital costs 
associated with collecting water, as discussed above.  The data on number of connections in 
Table 1 shows that there is substantial size variation, from around 50 thousand properties for 
a number of the regional businesses to over 1.5 million in Sydney, the largest city in 
Australia. 
A hilly topography can affect costs because of the extra pumping costs that are 
generally incurred.  The data on electricity usage per connection (which is highly correlated 
with pumping activity) reported in Table 1, exhibits a wide range of values, from a low of 6 
kw per connection for Yarra Valley, which receives all of its water supply from catchments 
up in the hills outside Melbourne, to a high of 332 for Adelaide, which needs to pump over 
40% of its water from the Murray River. 
The soil type can be important, with clay soils contributing to more pipe breakages, 
especially for the older terracotta pipe networks, and hence higher maintenance costs.   
However, clay soils can also mean a better seal on the dams and hence lower water losses 
contributing to lower water catchment capital costs.  Information on soil type differences is 
not readily available, however it is known that cities such as Perth have a low clay content in 
their soils, relative to some other cities in Australia. 
Differences in demand management policies (e.g. water use restrictions) can also 
influence costs via its effect on volumes per customer and also upon the ratio of peak to 
average flow.  Once again, information on this factor is not readily available (nor easy to 
define), however it is known that these businesses have placed varying degrees of emphasis 
on demand management in recent years.  For example, due to water catchment constraints, 
Gold Coast Water has been active in this area for some years, with the results of this activity 
reflected in their low peak to average ratio in Table 1. 
                                                 
7 This is a view that is commonly expressed by both regulators and regulated water businesses in Australia.  
However it is interesting to note that Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983, p674) hold the opposite view in that they 
expect the costs of US water companies to increase with density because of the need for “more hydrants, higher 
water pressure and greater peak capacities for fire protection”.   8
Other differences in local regulations and policies, such as water pressure standards, 
minimum capacity standards (set by fire authorities), water quality standards and reliability 
standards, can also affect costs, however these are generally fairly uniform across Australia.  
The above list of issues is not complete but does include some of the key cost drivers 
in this industry.  What is clear from this discussion is that comparative performance 
measurement in the urban water supply industry in Australia is a challenging exercise.  The 
model that we use in the empirical section of this paper will not be able to accommodate all 
of these factors completely, due to data constraints and degrees of freedom constraints.   
Hence the performance measures obtained should clearly be used carefully.
8 
 
3. Review of literature  
In this section we review some studies that have conducted economic analyses of urban water 
supply businesses using empirical modelling techniques such as regression analysis, data 
envelopment analyses and stochastic frontier analysis.  The review does not include any 




The question of the relative efficiency of public versus privately owned utilities led to a 
number of econometric analyses of water supply utilities in the USA in the late 1970’s and 
1980’s.  First, Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) estimate a Cobb-Douglas cost function and 
conclude that the public firms have significantly higher costs, relative to private firms.  Their 
model involved a (logarithmic) regression of cost on output quantity, labour price, capital 
price and an ownership dummy variable.  The output measure used was volume of water 
delivered while the cost measure was the sum of operating, maintenance and depreciation 
costs.  This output measure can be criticised on the basis that it assumes a homogenous 
output, while the cost measure is also sub-optimal because it excludes the opportunity cost of 
capital. 
A later study by Bruggink (1982) also comes to the same conclusions regarding the 
superiority of private firms using a similar approach.  These two studies are then criticised in 
a subsequent study by Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), who argue that the empirical work in 
                                                 
8 This statement will be made even more strongly in later discussion where we discuss some of the data 
comparability issues, especially on the capital side of things.   9
these two previous studies is flawed because of: (i) the use of volume as the only output 
measure; (ii) the use of a simple functional form;
9 and (iii) the omission of relevant factor 
prices.  They go on to specify a cost function model in which output is modelled using a 
hedonic function (which includes variables reflecting metering, treatment levels, density, 
capacity utilisation, customer size and water purchases); a more general translog functional 
form is specified; and an electricity price variable is included (in addition to labour and 
capital prices).  They conclude that there are no significant differences in the costs of public 
and private firms.  However, for some reason they exclude capital costs from their cost 
measure, which seems strange given that capital costs generally exceed operating costs in 
most network utilities.  
Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes (1986) also address the private/public issue, but they 
instead decide to use the linear programming technique known as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to estimate levels of technical efficiency for each firm in the sample.  They argue that 
their approach should be preferred to the cost function methods because of: (i) a lack of 
reliable data on (the economic notion of) capital costs; (ii) input quantity data being more 
reliable than input price data; (iii) no need to impose a function form; and (iv) the method 
produces estimates of best practice performance as opposed to average performance.  They 
specify a production model with one output variable, volume of water delivered, and seven 
input variables: ground water, surface water, purchased water, part-time labour, full-time 
labour, length of pipeline and storage capacity.  They conclude that there are no significant 
differences in the technical efficiency scores (nor the scale efficiency scores) of private 
versus public firms.   
On face value, the Byrnes et al (1986) study could be criticised for not including more 
output indicators (as used in the Feigenbaum and Teeples study).  However, as they point out, 
the input variables used are likely to control for a number of these differences in output 
characteristics.  For example, the use of the three water source variables will ensure that firms 
with similar water source mixes will be benchmarked with each other,
10 while the use of two 
capital proxies (storage capacity and length of pipelines) should mean that firms with similar 
network densities will generally be benchmarked with each other. 
                                                 
9 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is restrictive in the sense that it imposes constant input elasticities and 
elasticities of substitution which are equal to one (Coelli, Rao & Battese, 1998:201). 
10 This is because in output orientated DEA the method measures technical efficiency as the maximum amount 
by which output can be expanded, while holding the input quantities (and hence mixes) fixed.   10
Teeples and Glyer (1987) provide a comparison of the models of Crain and Zardkoohi 
(1978), Bruggink (1982) and Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), using data on water utilities in 
California, and argue that the differing conclusions in these earlier papers can be put down to 
the model restrictions implicit in the earlier papers. 
Interest in the issue of public versus private ownership of water supply companies in 
the US waned for a decade or so until another round of studies surfaced in the mid 1990’s 
authored by Bhattarcharyya and colleagues: Bhattarcharyya, Parker and Raffie (1994) and 
Bhattarcharyya et al (1995a,b).  These three studies also estimated econometric cost 
functions, but used more up-to-date data and looked at a number of alternative 
methodological approaches, such as (i) specifying a short run cost function (with capital 
quantity specified as a regressor); (ii) estimating the cost function in a system with first order 
equations; (iii) estimating a shadow cost system to reflect possible deviations from cost 
minimising behaviour; (iv) estimating the cost function using stochastic frontier techniques; 
(v) including quality variables such as system disruptions and water losses in the model, etc.   
Lambert and Dichev (1993) also conducted a comparison of privately and publicly 
owned water utilities.  They used data on 238 public and 32 private firms from a 1989 survey 
conducted by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) and measured technical, 
allocative and scale efficiency using DEA.  The single output variable used was total water 
delivered, while the four input variables used inputs were: annual labour use in hours; British 
thermal units of energy used; value of material inputs used; and value of capital.  The study 
finds that technical inefficiency is the main source of inefficiency and that there are no 
significant difference between private and public firms. 
 
UK Studies 
The 1990’s also heralded the arrival of several studies using UK data, motivated by the 
privatisation moves in the early 1990’s in the UK.  These include the stochastic cost frontier 
analysis study by Lynk (1993); the comparison of DEA and regression methods in Cubbin 
and Tzanidakis (1998); the DEA studies of Thanassoulis (2000a,b) the cost function study of 
Ashton (2000); the Tornqvist total factor productivity (TFP) index study of Saal and Parker 
(2000) and the stochastic cost frontier study of Saal and Parker (2001). 
In one of his SFA cost function models, Lynk (1993) studied the efficiency of 22 
privately-owned water companies from 1984/85 to 1987/88.  The dependent variable was 
operating cost, with the regressor variables being one output variable (water supplied); one 
input price variable (unit labour cost), and dummy variables for time and geography.  The   11
model was unusual in that it did not include a fixed capital variable, and did not attempt to 
accommodate the effects of customer size and network density. 
Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) used 1994/95 UK water industry data to conduct a 
comparison of regression analysis (RA) and DEA. A measure of operating expenditure 
adjusted for factors outside the companies’ control and unrelated to observable cost drivers 
was used as the sole input variable. Outputs were water delivered, length of mains and the 
proportion of water delivered to non-households.  The results indicate differences in rankings, 
and the authors conclude that DEA is best used when large samples are available, although 
RA does not put individual weights on variables and as such may not be as fair to individual 
firms.  
Thanassoulis (2000a and 2000b) undertook a data envelopment analysis of water 
distribution in the UK using data obtained from OFWAT.  He included the input of operating 
expenditure, and argued for the exclusion of capital costs from the input(s) because OFWAT 
saw  no convincing evidence that operating expenditure and capital expenditure were 
inversely related.  Output measures used include number of properties connected, length of 
mains, volume of water delivered and pipe bursts.  The choice of length of mains and pipe 
bursts as output variables are arguably controversial.  The mains variable was included to 
attempt to capture the effects of network density.  However, given that mains are a capital 
input, the use of mains as an output variable could perhaps signal to firms that more input is 
better.  Mains bursts were included to attempt to reflect the fact that certain networks are 
more susceptible to bursts and hence require more reactive maintenance.  However, one 
could alternatively argue that one would normally require a water company to attempt to 
minimise pipe bursts (through better maintenance) rather than maximise them. Once again, 
this output variable could send rather unusual incentive signals to the firm being assessed, in 
the medium term. 
 
Other studies 
In addition to these US and UK studies, a handful of additional studies have appeared in 
recent years.  For example, the cost function study of French water supply businesses in 
Garcia and Thomas (2001); the SFA cost frontier study of water supply industries in Asian 
countries by Estache and Rossi (2002) and the DEA study of Mexican water supply 
businesses in Anwandter and Teofilo (2002).  These papers tend to use similar methods to 
those discussed above. 
   12
4. Performance measurement methods 
Simple ratio measures, such as water delivered per employee and operating costs per 
connection, are widely used performance measures.  The popularity of these ratio measures, 
which we will call “partial productivity measures”, stems from the fact that they are easy to 
construct and also easy to interpret.  However, in many cases these ratio measures are 
unreliable indicators of the “true productivity” of the business.  This is because a particular 
business could have high operating costs per connection because it is poorly managed and 
wasteful, or it alternatively it could be due to factors not under the immediate control of the 
managers, such as (i) having high volumes per connection (due to a large proportion of non-
residential customers or due to climatic factors); (ii) servicing an area with a low population 
density; (iii) owning assets which have a high average age and hence require more 
maintenance costs; (iv) being a small business and hence suffering from diseconomies of 
scale; and so on. 
The key problem with this ratio measure of operating costs per connection is that it is 
a partial productivity measure, in that it does not include all information on the inputs and 
outputs used by the firm.
11  For example, it does not include output characteristics related to 
volumes per connection nor network density, and it ignores capital inputs, such as pipes and 
pumps.  Furthermore, it does not take account of differences in the size of the business.  
These problems could perhaps be addressed by dividing the sample of firms up into a number 
of groups according to business size, and then according to volumes per customer, and then 
according to network density, and then according to capital intensity – but soon you would 
find that most cells in the four dimensional table would contain one firm or fewer, and hence 
a benchmarking exercise would not be sensible. 
As an alternative to this, we use a method known as data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
in this study.  This technique uses linear programming methods to build a piece-wise surface 
over data (on input and output quantities) for a sample of firms and then assesses the 
efficiency of each firm by measuring the distance that each data point lies below the best 
practice production frontier.  This technique has the advantage that it can accommodate 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs, and produces information on “peer firms” for each of 
the inefficient firms.  That is, those firms that have a similar input mix, output mix and scale 
of operation (to the particular inefficient firm), but are located on the frontier surface, and 
                                                 
11 See related discussion of the gas supply industry in Carrington, Coelli and Groom (2002).   13
hence are producing the same output with fewer inputs.  This method will be described in 
more detail shortly. 
As is evident from the review of literature in the previous section, other techniques, 
such as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and total 
factor productivity (TFP) indices calculated using price-based index numbers (PIN), have 
also been used in analyses of water industry performance in overseas studies.  OLS methods 
are well known and easy to implement, however they could be criticised on the basis that 
they require the specification of a functional form for the production technology and they 
provide information on average performance rather than frontier performance.   
SFA is an econometric technique that addresses this latter problem, by specifying a 
composed error term, with one part used to capture data noise and the other inefficiency.  
However SFA methods still require a functional form to be specified, plus distribution forms 
for its composed error structure.  PIN methods, such as the popular Tornqvist TFP index, 
suffer from the problem that they require access to reliable price information (which is often 
difficult to obtain) plus they do not explicitly accommodate scale effects.   
The DEA method used in this study is a frontier method that does not require 
specification of a functional form or a distributional form, and can accommodate scale issues.  
Hence it can address the above problems.  However, DEA has the disadvantage that it does 
not explicitly accommodate the effects of data noise, while OLS and SFA methods do.  On 
balance we have decided to use DEA methods here because we believe that data noise is less 
of an issue in an industry such as water supply, where accounting standards are high (relative 
to the case of small farmers in a developing country where SFA would be a wiser choice),
12 
and because DEA is able to readily produce rich information on technical efficiency, scale 
efficiency and peers.  However, in future work we plan to also use SFA methods to 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of methodology.
13 
 
Efficiency measurement using DEA 
DEA uses linear programming (LP) to obtain the measures of technical efficiency (TE).  The 
input-orientated DEA LP is set up so as to maximise the TE score of the i-th firm, subject to 
                                                 
12 See Coelli (1995) for further discussion. 
13 See Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998) for further details regarding these various methods and their relative merits.   14
production remaining within the feasible set of production possibilities.
14  This involves the 
solution of the following LP problem. 
 minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
  θxi - Xλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0,  (1) 
where yi is a M×1 vector of outputs produced by the i-th firm, xi is a K×1 vector of inputs 
used by the i-th firm, Y is the M×N matrix of outputs of the N firms in the sample,  X is the 
K×N matrix of inputs of the N firms, λ is a N×1 vector of weights (which relate to the peer 
firms) and θ is a scalar measure of TE, which takes a value between 0 and 1 inclusive.  This 
problem is be solved N times – once for each firm in the sample.
15 
The above DEA LP has become known as the constant returns to scale (CRS) DEA 
model because the resulting technology will be a CRS technology.  Thus, the efficiency 
scores obtained from this DEA model will be influenced by scale effects, if they exist.  This 
may not be desirable in some cases, since firms cannot always influence scale in the short 
run. The above CRS DEA LP can be adjusted in order to allow a variable returns to scale 
(VRS) DEA technology. This is done by adding a convexity constraint to the original 
problem, resulting in the following LP, 
 minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
  θxi - Xλ ≥ 0, 
  N 1 ′λ=1 
  λ ≥ 0,  (2) 
where N1 is a vector of ones.  This VRS LP produces technical efficiency scores that are 
either greater than or equal to those from the CRS problem. This means that the variable 
returns to scale specification gives “pure” technical efficiency scores, which are free of scale 
efficiency effects.   
                                                 
14 DEA models can be either input or output orientated.  In the input orientation the efficiency scores relate to 
the largest feasible proportional reduction in inputs for fixed outputs, while in the output orientation it 
corresponds to the largest feasible proportional expansion in outputs for fixed inputs.  It is common practice to 
use an input orientation in analyses of network utilities because the firms are generally required to supply 
services to a fixed geographical area, and hence the output vector is essentially fixed.  For example, see 
discussion in Coelli et al (2003, p41). 
15 The discussion here is based on that in Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998).   15
A scale efficiency (SE) score can be derived (for each firm) by dividing the CRS TE 
score by the VRS TE score. This SE score also takes a value between 0 and 1 inclusive.  
 
Productivity measurement using DEA 
If one has access to suitable panel data, Fare et al (1994) have shown that DEA frontier 
construction methods can be used to obtain estimates of Malmquist TFP index numbers. This 
approach also has an advantage relative to PIN TFP methods (e.g. Törnqvist TFP indices) 
that: 
•  price data are not required; 
•  the TFP indices obtained may be decomposed into components: 
o  technical change (frontier-shift),  
o  technical efficiency change (catch-up). 
The one principal drawback of the Malmquist methods is that panel data are required, 
while the PIN methods may be calculated with only a single observation in each time period.  
However, this is not an issue in this study because we have panel data on 18 firms over an 
eight-year period. 
  The Malmquist TFP index measures the TFP change between two data points by 
calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a common technology.  If 
the period t technology is used as the reference technology, the Malmquist (input-orientated) 
TFP change index between period s (the base period) and period t is can be written as 
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Note that in the above equations the notation di
s(xt, yt) represents the distance from the period 
t observation to the period s technology.  When t = s this distance is equivalent to the 
technical efficiency scores defined earlier.  A value of Mi greater than one will indicate 
positive TFP growth from period s to period t while a value less than one indicates a TFP 
decline.     16
  As noted by Färe, Grosskopf and Roos (1998), these two (period s and period t) 
indices are only equivalent if the technology is Hicks output neutral.  That is, if the output 
distance functions may be represented as di
t(x,y) = A(t)di(x,y), for all t.  To avoid the 
necessity to either impose this restriction or to arbitrarily choose one of the two technologies, 
the Malmquist TFP index is often defined as the geometric mean of these two indices.  That 
is, 
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An equivalent way of writing this productivity index is  
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where the ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in the input-oriented measure 
of Farrell technical efficiency between periods s and t.  That is, the efficiency change is 
equivalent to the ratio of the Farrell technical efficiency in period t to the Farrell technical 
efficiency in period s.  The remaining part of the index in equation 5 is a measure of technical 
change.  It is the geometric mean of the shift in technology between the two periods, 
evaluated at xt and also at xs.  Thus the two terms in equation 6 are: 
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The four distance measures in equation 5 are calculated by solving four DEA-like linear 
programming (LP) problems. The required LPs are:
16 
 d i
t(yt, xt) = minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yit + Ytλ ≥ 0, 
  θxit - Xtλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0,  (9) 
 
                                                 
16 Note that these are CRS DEA models.  CRS is required to ensure that the TFP index includes scale effects.  
For further discussion see Coelli et al (1998).   17
 d i
s(ys, xs) = minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yis + Ysλ ≥ 0, 
  θxis - Xsλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0,  (10) 
 
 d i
t(ys, xs) = minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yis + Ytλ ≥ 0, 
  θxis - Xtλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0,  (11) 
and 
 d i
s(yt, xt) = minθ,λ θ, 
 st  -yit + Ysλ ≥ 0, 
  θxit - Xsλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0,  (12) 
These four LP’s must be solved for each firm in the sample.  Thus when there are 18 firms 
and two time periods, 74 LP’s must be solved.  As extra time periods are added, one must 
solve an extra three LP’s for each of the 18 firms (to construct a chained index for each firm).  
Thus we need to solve 74+3*18*6=398 LP’s in this instance. 
 
5. Data and empirical results 
Data 
The data used in this exercise is taken from WSAAfacts (2003, 2001).  The data produced in 
these WSAAfacts publications is very detailed and comprehensive.  However, since the data 
was not collected with this study specifically in mind, we do note that some of the variables 
we use are clearly sub-optimal, and hence our results should be viewed with caution and 
should only be viewed as preliminary in nature.   
Two data sets are used in this section.  The first is annual data on the 18 firms from 
the 2002/03 financial year.  This is the most recent available information and hence will be 
used to calculate the technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores.  The second data set is 
panel data, containing data on these 18 firms over an eight-year period from 1995/96 to 
2002/03.  When discussing this latter data set the issue of the selection of appropriate price 
deflators becomes important.   18
The selection of the input and output variables that are to be included in a DEA model 
is a complicated exercise.  The decision process in this study is guided by our discussion of 
the cost drivers in the industry; our review of the overseas literature; our knowledge of the 
available data in WSAAfacts; and by the degrees of freedom constraints that we face when 
using such a small sample size.  We have decided to limit our attention to models that involve 
no more than four variables, due to our degrees of freedom constraints.   
We have chosen two output variables: 
•  number of properties connected (PROP), and 
•  volume of water delivered (WDEL), 
and two input variables: 
•  operating expenditure (OPEX), and 
•  capital (CAP). 
This set of output indicators is a set that is often used in network industries, such as water, 
electricity and gas.  They are included to ensure that firms with similar average customer 
sizes are benchmarked with each other.
17  The other main output attribute, network density, is 
accommodated indirectly in this model by ensuring that the input set contains both a capital 
and a non-capital variable.  Given that the capital intensity of these firms is primarily 
determined by their network density (ie. sparse networks tend to have higher amounts of 
pipeline capital relative to OPEX because their customers are further apart) this will tend to 
ensure that high density firms are benchmarked with similar firms and vice versa.   
Some previous studies have broken up OPEX in to smaller variables, such as labour 
and non-labour measures.  This allows one to use physical measures of labour if available.  
Since we had no data on the labour input, this was not a choice that was available to us.  
Furthermore, given the amount of outsourcing that is prevalent in many of these firms, the 
distinction between labour and non-labour OPEX would be rather arbitrary.  In addition, 
given our degrees of freedom constraints, the inclusion of an additional variable in the model 
would not be wise in any case. 
The choice of an appropriate measure of capital input is always a challenge in 
empirical analyses such as this.  Major water supply asset groups include pipes, pumps, 
treatment plants and storage, plus other groups such as vehicles, buildings and equipment.  
Given that detailed and comparable data on these various groups were not available and given 
                                                 
17 An alternative set of output indicators could be to have volume delivered to small customers and volume 
delivered to large customers.  However, such data was not available to us, and would be unlikely to provide a 
better fit if available.   19
our degrees of freedom constraints, the obvious option was for us to find a monetary measure 
that could provide a reasonable proxy for the aggregate quantity of capital used.  Our first 
choice was a depreciation measure, but none was available in WSAAfacts.  Hence we 
considered using the capital stock variable: “written down current cost of fixed assets”.  This 
could be a reasonable measure of capital consumption if each firm had a portfolio of assets 
with similar average asset lives and hence the stock of capital would be roughly proportional 
to the consumption of capital.  However the measure we finally decided to use was capital 
(CAP) equal to “total expenditure” (TOTEX) minus OPEX.  This was because TOTEX was 
calculated as OPEX plus capital costs, where capital costs were equal to depreciation plus 4% 
of the written down current cost of fixed assets.  This measure is clearly designed to be more 
a capital cost measure as opposed to a capital quantity measure, however it has the 
advantages that it will be affected by average asset lives and it is also the measure which 
WSAA members are familiar with. 
This capital measure is not without a number of problems.  First, it is based on a 
depreciated (written down) capital stock measure and hence if a firm has an average asset age 
lower than the average firm, they will appear to be using more capital, even though the 
service potential of “a kilometre of pipe” is likely to be quite similar across the firms.   
Second, different companies use different valuation methods, which is likely to introduce 
noise into this measure.  Third, the firms tend to do one-off asset revaluations in certain years 
(eg. every 5 years or so) and then use the consumer price index (CPI) to revalue their assets 
in the intervening years.  Given that changes in asset construction costs often deviate from the 
CPI (see discussion below), this can mean that a firm which has done a recent revaluation of 
assets may appear to be using substantially more (or less) capital relative to the average firm, 
depending on the relationship between these two price indices. 
The above discussion of the capital measure does not make for happy reading.  Hence, 
as a robustness check, we have also used the “total length of mains” (MAINS) as an 
alternative capital measure in some models.  This measure will also be sub-optimal because it 
implicitly assumes that the quantities of other capital items (pumps, plants etc.) are used in 
proportion to pipeline capital. 
When we use data from 1995/96 through to 2002/03 to calculate productivity growth 
over time we must also consider how we are going to convert our monetary measures (OPEX 
and CAP) into real measures, because they are meant to be proxies for the quantities of inputs 
used.  In WSAAfacts this issue is dealt with by the use of the CPI.  However, the CPI 
(reflecting price movements in food, housing, etc.) may be a poor measure of price   20
movements in water supply variable inputs (eg. labour, chemicals, electricity) and water 
supply assets (eg. pipes, pumps, construction services, etc.).  To investigate this issue we 
searched for some more appropriate price index deflators.  Unfortunately, we could find none 
that were specific to the water industry, nor to network industries in general.  The best indices 
we could identify were: 
•  ABS Catalogue 5204.0, Australian System of National Accounts, Table 8, 
EXPENDITURE ON GDP, Implicit Price Deflators, Final Consumption Expenditure, 
General Government, State and Local, and 
•  ABS Catalogue 5204.0, Australian System of National Accounts, Table 8, 
EXPENDITURE ON GDP, Implicit Price Deflators, Public Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation, Public Corporations, State and Local, 
for OPEX and CAP, respectively.
18 
These two indices, which we will call the OPEX deflator (OD) and the CAP deflator 
(CD) are plotted in Figure 1, along with the CPI.  Note that the new OPEX price deflator 
follows a similar pattern to the CPI, but at a higher level, increasing by 25% as opposed to 
18%.  The new CAPEX price deflator, however, is well below these two indices, and in fact 
falls slightly, by 6%.  The flat nature of the new CAPEX price deflator is most likely a 
reflection of productivity savings in capital construction over this period. 
 
[Fig 1 here] 
 
To illustrate the effect of the use of these alternative deflators upon the OPEX and 
capital measures, we have plotted indices of the various measures (aggregate for the industry) 
in Figure 2.  The variables involving the CPI deflator are called OPEX and CAP, while those 
involving the new deflators are called OPEXN and CAPN.  It is interesting to note that when 
the CPI is used, the CAP index has no net change over the eight year period, while when the 
new capital deflator is used CAPN increases by 25%.  Given that the number of connections 
has increased by 14% and the water quality requirements have increased over this period, the 
CAPN measure is likely to be closer to the “truth” relative to the CAP measure.  However, 
                                                 
18 For details, see the ABS web site http://www.abs.gov.au/.   21
when we observe that the length of mains have only increase by 5%, we begin to suspect that 
some number in the middle of 0% and 25% is likely to be closer to the mark.
19 
 
[Fig 2 here] 
 
Efficiency scores 
Given the above discussion, we have decided to use length of mains as a capital proxy in our 
preferred DEA model.  Thus it contains two output variables, WDEL and CONN, and two 
input variables, OPEX and MAINS.  Technical efficiency (TE), scale efficiency (SE) and 
CRS technical efficiency (CRSTE=TE×SE) scores are listed in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 
3.  The mean TE score is 0.904, which indicates that the average firm could reduce input 
usage by 9.6% and still produce the same output level.
20  Seven firms have TE scores of 1, 
indicating that they are on the DEA frontier: Brisbane, City West, Gosford, Goulburn Valley, 
Melbourne, Darwin and Sydney.   
The location of a firm such as Darwin on the DEA frontier may come as a surprise to 
some, given that it traditionally has high costs per connection (see for example WSAA, 
2001).  But it should be kept in mind that Darwin has a high WDEL/CONN ratio relative to 
most firms, and hence is likely to be located near the fringe of the DEA frontier, with few 
other peers to compare with.  Similar comments could be made with regard to other firms in 
the sample that are especially unique in some aspects.  For example, if the are especially large 
firms, such as Sydney and Melbourne, relative to the remainder of the sample.  Thus, the 
DEA method can be a bit too generous to these types of “fringe firms”.
21  
One way in which the study could be amended to attempt to address this problem 
associated with “fringe firms” is to include data on extra businesses from other countries, as 
is done in the Carrington et al (2001) gas supply study.  The inclusion of data on firms from 
other countries can also be important for those firms in the “centre” of the data set if the local 
firms are as a group inefficient relative to world’s best practice.
22  However, this can be a 
                                                 
19 This discussion emphasises the questionable nature of all the available capital measures, and indicates that 
substantially better data would need to be collected before this type of analysis could provide input to a 
regulatory discussion. 
20 Keeping in mind all previous comments about data quality and model simplifications. 
21 Parametric methods, such as SFA, are less susceptible to this type of problem, because the parametric frontier 
does not have the degree of local flexibility that a DEA frontier has. 
22 For example, see the international benchmarking study of Australian electricity supply in BIE (1996, p96), 
where it was found that the performance of the Australian electricity supply industry (measured using a total 
factor productivity index) was approximately 30% below the US electricity supply industry in the early 1990’s.   22
challenging exercise, with data comparability issues generally becoming more complex, as 
discussed in Coelli et al (2003, p94).   
The mean SE score in Table 2 is 0.903, indicating that the average firm should be able 
to reduce input use (per unit of output) by 9.7% if it was able to change its scale of operation.  
However, it should be kept in mind that the size of many of these firms is determined by 
geographical factors, and hence the option of changing scale is not available.  The final 
column in Table 2 provides information on the nature of scale economies, from which we 
note that all 12 firms that have scale inefficiency do so because of their small size.  That is, 
they are located on the increasing returns to scale (IRS) portion of the DEA frontier.  The 
small firms from regional Victoria, Barwon, Central Gippsland, Central Highlands, Coliban 
and Goulburn Valley, have the lowest SE scores in the sample. 
When we look at the CRSTE scores, which equal the product of the TE and SE 
scores, we observe that the CRSTE scores are quite low for these small regional firms.  This 
is also evident in many of the commonly reported partial productivity measures, such as 
OPEX/WDEL and OPEX/CONN, and emphasises the point that these partial ratios can be 
quite misleading because they do not account for scale economies. 
 
 [Table 2 here] 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Given the concerns that we have with our capital measure, we decided that it would 
be wise to repeat the DEA analysis with our MAINS measure replaced with CAP.  The 
results obtained were reassuringly similar, with the exception of some small changes for 
Brisbane and Hunter.  The TE scores for the two models are plotted in Figure 4 for ease of 
comparison. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Another test of the worth of our DEA model is to run a second-stage regression of the 
TE scores upon various factors that we know are not explicitly accounted for in the model 
and hence may be influencing the TE scores obtained.  Hence, using the TE scores from 
Table 2 and information on percentage of non-residential connections; percentage of water 
from non-catchment sources; average annual rainfall (mm); average maximum temperature   23
(degrees C); peak to average flow; and electricity consumption per connection (all from 
Table 1) we ran a second-stage regression.  None of these factors had estimated coefficients 
that were significant at the five percent or ten percent levels.  Hence, we can be reasonably 
confident in the quality of our DEA model. 
 
Productivity Growth 
In the above efficiency analysis we consider two different models because of our concerns 
with the capital measure.  In our analysis of productivity growth we have the additional 
complexity of the choice of price deflators.  As a result, we have chosen to calculate four 
different sets of Malmquist DEA TFP measures.  The technical efficiency change (TEC), 
technical change (TC) and TFP change (TFPC) from these four models are summarised in 
Table 3.  The first set of results relate to the preferred model where MAINS are used to proxy 
capital and the new deflator is used to deflate OPEX.  For this model we see that average 
annual TFP change over these 18 firms over 8 years is equal to a 1.2% decline per year.  This 
measure can be decomposed into a 2.2% technical regress per year and 1.2% increase in 
technical efficiency per year.
23   
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The other three sets of results in Table 3 are within 0.6% of the above TFP change 
measures.  The second model, involving MAINS and the CPI deflator, obtains TFP change of 
minus 1.5% per year.  This is slightly below the preferred model results, because the smaller 
CPI deflator suggests that OPEX is growing at a faster real rate.  The third model, involving 
CAPN and the new deflators, obtains TFP change of minus 1.7% per year.  This again is 
slightly below the preferred model results, because the CAPN measure grows at a faster rate 
relative to MAINS, suggesting greater capital input usage.  Finally, The fourth model, 
involving CAP and the CPI deflator, obtains TFP change of minus 0.6% per year.  This is 
slightly above the preferred model results, because the CAP measure grows at a slower rate 
relative to MAINS, suggesting less capital input usage.   
More detailed results for the preferred model involving MAINS and the new deflator are 
provided in Table 4, where the time-wise patterns are listed, and in Table 5, where the firm-
                                                 
23 These figures do not add to zero because of rounding.   24
level results are provided.  The average annual TFP changes vary from plus 3.6% to minus 
5.1%, while the average firm-level changes vary from plus 1.6% to minus 5.0%. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The negative measures of TFP change obtained warrant further comment.  First, the 
price deflators used are approximate, and hence these could be influencing things.  Second, 
during this period, demand management strategies were put in place in many firms, which 
would have had a dampening effect upon WDEL and hence upon the aggregate output 
measure.  Third, quality improvement strategies were put in place in many firms during this 
period, which would be reflected in higher input use, but not in higher output production, 
because the quality of the services provided are not explicitly reflected in the DEA model 
used.  Fourth, we note that some of the smallest companies in the sample have the lowest 
productivity growth.  That is, Barwon, Central Highlands, Coliban, Goulburn Valley and 
Darwin have the lowest TFP growth.  Thus our unweighted measure of TFP growth is likely 
to understate the aggregate TFP growth in the industry.  Lastly, the largest reduction in TFP 
growth occurred in the final year of the sample.  If we had finished our sample one year 
earlier, the average TFP growth would have been almost one percentage point higher. 
With reference to some of the above comments, we conducted a few extra 
calculations to gauge the sensitivity of our results to some of these factors.  First, we 
calculated the weighted average TFP growth for the industry using CONN as the weight, and 
found that the aggregate TFP change measure increased from minus 1.2% to 0.0%, reflecting 
the better performance of the larger firms in the sample.  Second, we reran the preferred 
model with WDEL omitted from the output set, to attempt to adjust for the possible effects of 
demand management initiatives, and obtained an average TFP growth of plus 0.4% per year.  
Furthermore, when we applied the above firm weights to these new scores we obtained an 
average TFP growth of plus 1.1% per year.  However, this measure could potentially 
overstate the rate of TFP growth because it does not reflect the fact that WDEL/CONN is 
reducing over time, which should imply less cost per connection. 
 
Use in price regulation   25
How might a regulator use these efficiency and productivity growth results in implementing 
price-cap regulation?  Given that the regulator is reasonably confident in the data that is used 
in the study (which would not be the case in this particular case), we provide the following 
illustrative example.   
In most cases, price caps are set over a five-year term.  The regulator will allow firms 
to increase prices each year by CPI-X, where X is a measure of the expected productivity 
improvements.  The value of X is usually based upon a measure of previous TFP growth in 
the industry.  Also, if the regulator believes some firms are more inefficient than other firms 
it will ask the more inefficient firms to achieve higher X factors.   
The regulator may require all firms to achieve the weighted mean annual productivity 
growth of 1.1 % we obtained from the TFP model where WDEL was omitted (assuming that 
demand management policies are likely to continue over the next five years).  Furthermore, it 
could require firms with DEA technical efficiency scores below one to catch up 50% of the 
way to the frontier over the next five years.  This is a conservative request, designed to 
account for the fact that the technical efficiency scores are measured with error, and also to 
reflect the fact that some firms will find it difficult to make efficiency savings if they face 
constraints, such as having excess capacity in areas where projected growth is low, etc. 
We have used the above rules to construct illustrative X factors for the 18 WSAA 
firms.  We have taken the TE scores from Table 2 and produced X factors for each firm, 
which are reported in Table 6.  To illustrate how the X factor values in Table 6 were 
calculated, consider the first listed firm, Canberra, which has a TE score of 0.755.  It would 
be required to catch up (1-0.755)/2=0.123 or 12.3% over the five year period.  Which is 
(1.16)
1/5=1.023 or 2.3% compounded catch-up per year.  Thus its X factor would be 
1.1+2.3=3.4% per year. 
The X factors in Table 6 range from 1.1% per year for the frontier firms, to 4.6 % per 
year for Central Highlands, the firm with the lowest technical efficiency score (0.627).  The 
average X factor is 2.0 % per year.  An X factor of 2.0 % implies that the firm must reduce 
unit costs in real terms by 2.0 % per year.   
However, it should be emphasised that these types of X factors, derived from a process 
such as this, should not be used in a prescriptive or mechanical manner.  The numbers should 
ideally be used as a “starting point” for discussions between the regulator and the regulated.  
For example, Adelaide, which has an illustrative X factor of 2.6, that is above the average 
value of 2.0, may wish to argue that the DEA model has not properly taken account of the 
fact that it must pipe almost half of its water from the Murray river, which results in higher   26
pumping costs and treatment costs (due to silt and salt) relative to a firm such as Sydney 
which derives almost all its water from catchment sources.  Adelaide may wish to attempt to 
cost out the extra expenses involved and then make a case to the regulator for a reduced X 
factor on this basis. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
We should also reiterate our earlier comments regarding data quality.  The above 
illustrative X-factors are based upon a DEA model that used length of mains as a proxy for 
the capital input.  This is a sub-optimal measure, which was used because we had even less 
faith in the reliability of the capital measures, which were based upon a variety of valuation 
techniques in different businesses, including (i) a detailed replacement cost valuation of each 
item in the asset register, (ii) using the CPI to scale an asset valuation made some years 
before, and (iii) in some cases simply scaling the historical cost valuation by a “ball-park” 
factor, such as 1.5.   
The capital valuation issue is not our only concern.  In addition we note that all of these 
businesses also supply wastewater services to their customers.  To our knowledge, it is 
unlikely that all businesses are using the same set of overhead cost allocation rules.  Thus it is 
possible that some firms may putting more (or less) overhead costs into the “water supply 
costs bucket” versus the “wastewater services bucket”, relative to the industry average.  If 
this is the case, the water supply efficiency measures will be biased. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that our initial plan in this study was to attempt to 
measure the efficiency of the water distribution business alone.  That is, with the wholesale 
part of the business (water collection and treatment) removed so we could have a better 
chance of comparing like with like, because the wholesale activities are the ones that are most 
heavily affected by differing local environmental conditions.  However, the published data 
did not allow us to do this.  This is one avenue that regulators could consider in the future, 
when collecting data for exercises such as these. 
While on the topic of differing environments, it is worth noting that some observers have 
expressed concerns regarding the fact that the above (illustrative) X-factors are based upon a 
TE score from a particular year, and that these TE scores can be significantly affected by 
annual climatic differences in a country such as Australia, where a large percentage of water 
is used on gardens.  One possible solution to this problem is to use an average of TE scores 
over recent years.  However, this could disadvantage those firms who have had TE scores   27
that are trending upwards in recent years.  A preferable option could be to use some form of 
smoothing on the volume data, such as using a three-year moving average in the DEA model, 
and then simply use the TE score from the final period.   
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we provide (to our knowledge) the first published set of comprehensive 
performance measures for the Australian water supply industry.  We use DEA to provide 
measures of technical efficiency and scale efficiency for each of the 18 WSAA businesses in 
2002/03.  We also provide TFP change measures for each firm over the eight-year period 
from 1995/96 to 2002/03.  Our results indicate that the average firm has a technical efficiency 
score of 90.4% and has annual average TFP growth of between minus 1.7 % and plus 1.1%, 
depending upon the measures used in each DEA TFP model. 
The above range of TFP measures illustrate the importance of the choice of data used 
in these studies.  Our analysis has highlighted a number of data related issues that warrant 
further attention before the results of a study such as this could be considered for use in 
aiding the decision making process in the price regulation of water supply businesses.  In 
particular, the available data on capital needs improvement.  WSAA firms are using capital 
valuation methods that satisfy the relevant accounting standards.  However, the variety of 
methods used means that the available data is not comparable across firms.  Furthermore, a 
lack of appropriate water industry price deflators for use in the TFP calculations is an 
additional concern.  The ABS deflators used in this study were an improvement over the use 
of the CPI, but much work remains to be done in this area.   
It should be emphasised that these data problems would apply equally if we were to 
use a less sophisticated performance measurement technique, such as OPEX per ML of water 
delivered.  However, the DEA methods used here have advantages over this type of partial 
productivity ratio in that they are able to make adjustments for scale of operations, average 
customer size and density, so as to allow more appropriate comparisons of performance. 
This study represents our first attempt at the calculation of comprehensive 
performance measures for this industry.  Various avenues for further work remain.  First and 
foremost, the analysis should be repeated once better data is obtained (on capital value, price 
deflators, etc.).  Second, the work could be repeated using stochastic frontier methods (SFA) 
to judge the sensitivity of results to the choice of methodology.  Third, this study has 
focussed on water supply activities.  One could repeat the exercise for the wastewater   28
activities of these businesses, to obtain an indication of the overall performance of the urban 
water services industry in Australia. 
   29
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 

































Canberra 133 422 44.87 6.77 0.00 584 21 2.27 18 
Barwon 118 351 35.79 9.32 99.47 496 20 2.01 19 
Brisbane 403 411 68.39 8.19 0.00 1014 25 2.34 264 
Central Gippsland  57 360 29.95 10.53 20.08 744 21 3.00 236 
Central Highlands  53 336 25.99 9.43 3.68 616 19 1.98 31 
City West M  286 424 75.56 10.14 0.00 598 21 1.81 * 
Coliban 60 436 31.07 10.00 0.35 476 22 2.21 * 
Gold Coast  197 293 69.49 5.08 0.00 1215 26 1.45 85 
Gosford 65 256 69.44 4.62 32.83 1268 24 2.00 197 
Goulburn Valley  49 621 29.66 12.24 5.10 458 22 2.04 215 
Hunter 205 375 46.44 7.80 57.04 1114 22 1.79 169 
Melbourne Cons  1472 325 67.49 8.36 0.00 598 21 1.81 * 
Darwin 42 838 34.20 11.90 6.90 1953 33 1.52 292 
Adelaide 481 372 55.32 5.61 43.67 555 23 2.24 332 
South East M.  572 297 70.37 8.22 0.00 598 21 1.93 12 
Sydney 1638 388 79.93 7.08 1.36 1186 23 1.51 99 
Perth 621 342 52.50 10.95 50.19 781 25 1.73 167 
Yarra Valley M  614 306 71.03 7.65 0.00 598 21 1.88 6 
Average 393 397 53.19 8.55 17.82 825 23 1.97 143 
1.  A “*” indicates missing values. 
2.  All data from 2002/03 except for rainfall and temperature which are 10 year averages and non-catchment, peak and electricity which are from 2000/01. 
3.  Business names have been altered to more clearly reflect the cities they serve. 
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Table 2:  DEA efficiency scores, 2002/03 
firm TE-CRS  TE SE*  scale** 
Canberra  0.708 0.755 0.937  irs 
Barwon  0.618 0.826 0.748  irs 
Brisbane  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Central Gippsland  0.459 0.760 0.604  irs 
Central Highlands  0.371 0.627 0.591  irs 
City West M  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Coliban  0.600 0.849 0.707  irs 
Gold Coast  0.978 0.999 0.979  irs 
Gosford  0.934 1.000 0.934  irs 
Goulburn Valley  0.841 1.000 0.841  irs 
Hunter  0.749 0.797 0.939  irs 
Melbourne Cons  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Darwin  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Adelaide  0.847 0.847 1.000  - 
South East M.  0.971 0.976 0.995  irs 
Sydney  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Perth  0.832 0.846 0.984  irs 
Yarra Valley M  0.984 0.989 0.995  irs 
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Table 3:  Summary of results for four TFP models, 1995/96 to 2002/03 
Model TEC  TC  TFPC 
MAINS & new deflators  1.011  0.978  0.988 
MAINS & CPI  1.010  0.975  0.985 
CAP & new deflators  0.992  0.991  0.983 
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Table 4:  Annual average TFP results, 1995/96 to 2002/03 
year TEC  TC TFPC 
1996/97  0.997 1.039 1.036 
1997/98  1.123 0.88 0.988 
1998/99  0.993 0.979 0.972 
1999/00  0.955 1.01 0.964 
2000/01  1.024 1.005 1.029 
2001/02  0.991 0.993 0.984 
2002/03 1  0.949  0.949 




Table 5:  Annual average firm-level TFP results, 1995/96 to 2002/03 
firm  TEC TC  TFPC 
Canberra  1.040 0.960  0.998 
Barwon  1.005 0.963  0.968 
Brisbane  1.021 0.974  0.995 
Central Gippsland  1.011 0.989  1.000 
Central Highlands  0.960 1.016  0.975 
City West M  1.000 0.977  0.977 
Coliban  1.007 0.943  0.950 
Gold Coast  1.008 0.982  0.990 
Gosford  1.021 0.986  1.007 
Goulburn Valley  0.992 0.962  0.954 
Hunter  1.024 0.963  0.986 
Melbourne Cons  1.007 0.991  0.998 
Darwin  1.000 0.971  0.971 
Adelaide  1.039 0.969  1.007 
South East M.  1.012 0.996  1.009 
Sydney  1.018 0.998  1.016 
Perth  1.029 0.968  0.996 
Yarra Valley M  0.998 1.001  0.998 
mean  1.011 0.978  0.988 
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Table 6:  Illustrative calculation of X factors 
firm  TE  TFPC  catch up  X factor 
Canberra 0.755  1.1  2.3  3.4 
Barwon 0.826  1.1  1.7  2.8 
Brisbane 1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Central Gippsland  0.760  1.1  2.3  3.4 
Central Highlands  0.627  1.1  3.5  4.6 
City West M  1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Coliban 0.849  1.1  1.5  2.6 
Gold Coast  0.999  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Gosford 1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Goulburn Valley  1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Hunter 0.797  1.1  2.0  3.1 
Melbourne Cons  1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Darwin 1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Adelaide 0.847  1.1  1.5  2.6 
South East M.  0.976  1.1  0.2  1.3 
Sydney 1.000  1.1  0.0  1.1 
Perth 0.846  1.1  1.5  2.6 
Yarra Valley M  0.989  1.1  0.1  1.2 
mean 0.904  1.1 0.9 2.0 
 
 